PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE AND RACIAL
INTEGRATION
Stephen Eisdorfe*
The history of public education in America has been, almost
from the beginning, the history of efforts to reform public education. This is both understandable and appropriate. Public education is the means through which we shape the American polity for
the next generation. Debates about public education are debates
about what the America of the future should be. Efforts to reform
public schools are, at one remove, efforts to reform American
society.
"School choice" is rallying cry of one of the most visible public
school reform movements of the present era. The most enthusiastic school choice proponents characterize it as "the panacea" for
whatever is wrong with public education in America.' Presidents
Reagan and Bush both publicly espoused one or another of the
reforms of the school choice movement.2 The Bush administration
made school choice one of the principal themes of its school policies.' In some form choice is on the agenda of public school re* Senior staff attorney, New Jersey Department of the Public Advocate. B.A.,
Haverford College; J.D., Harvard Law School.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of Mr. Eisdorfer. They do not
necessarily reflect the opinions of the Department of the Public Advocate.
1 JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLS
217 (1990). Chubb and Moe assert that
[w] ithout being too literal about it, we think reformers would do well to
entertain the notion that choice is a panacea. This is our way of saying
that choice is not like the other reforms and should not be combined
with them as part of a reformist strategy for improving America's public
schools. Choice is self-contained reform with its own rationale and justification. It has the capacity all by itselfto bring about the kind of transformation that, for years, reformers have been seeking to engineer in
myriad other ways.
Id.
2 See, e.g., Ronald Reagan, Statement to the White House Conference on Choice
in Education, January 10, 1989, reprinted in NANCY PAULU, IMPROVING SCHOOLS AND
EMPOWERING PARENTS:
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29 (1989); George Bush, Statement to the White House Conference on Choice in Education, January 10, 1989, reprinted in id. at 31.
3 America 2000 Excellence in Education Act, H.R. 2460 and S. 1141, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1992).
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formers in virtually every state in the union.4 School choice has
generated or provoked an enormous literature-popular, scholarly, and otherwise.5
School choice can mean different things in the mouths of different speakers.' Among the public school reforms urged-not
necessarily all by the same, or even allied, proponents-in the
name of school choice are the following7 :
1. Replacing the existing system of publicly financed schools
with a system of vouchers issued to parents of all school-age children, which parents may use in their discretion at schools operated
by public entities or private entities. Various proposals envision varying degrees of public regulation of such schools, ranging from
detailed regulations regarding educational standards, program offerings, and admission criteria, to no public regulation at all. Various proposals envision different levels of voucher payments,
ranging from a small fraction of the actual tuition charge to the
full charge at elite private institutions.
2. Supplementing of the existing system of publicly financed
schools with a system of vouchers issued to some limited class of
parents, typically parents of school-age children located in urban
areas, which parents may use in their discretion at schools operated by public entities or private entities. As above, these proposals
vary in the degree of public regulation of eligible schools and the
amount of the voucher.
3. Permitting parents to enroll school-age children in any
public school, anywhere in the state, that will accept them. Proposals differ as to how much discretion schools have in selecting or
rejecting applicants, how much tuition they may charge, how much
4 CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, SCHOOL CHOICE

99-

112 (1992).
5 See, e.g., ERIC

CLEARINGHOUSE ON EDUCATIONAL MANAGEMENT, BIBLIOGRAPHY ON
SCHOOL CHOICE, VOUCHERS, AND OPEN ENROLLMENT (1993) (abstracting 247 journal

articles and reports written between 1987 and 1992).
236 (1989); Am9 (1991); Peter K. Rofes, Public
Law, Private School: Choice, the Constitution, and Some Emerging Issues, 21 J.L. & EDUC.
503, 504-06 (1992).
6 MYRON LIEBERMAN, PRIVATIZATION AND EDUCATIONAL CHOICE

GAIL THERNSTROM, SCHOOL CHOICE IN MASSACHUSETTS

7 For various types of school choice proposals, see CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, supra note 4, at 1-3; EDUCATION COMMISSION OF THE
STATES, POLICY GUIDE: A STATE POLICY MAKER'S GUIDE TO PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE
(1989), reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., REGIONAL STRATEGY MEETINGS ON CHOICE IN
EDUCATION (1989); Joe Nathan, Progress, Problems, and Prospects of State Educational
Choice Plans, in CHOICE IN EDUCATION: POTENTIAL AND PROBLEMS 263, 267-72 (William

Lowe Boyd & HerbertJ. Walberg eds., 1990).
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of that tuition is paid by public funds, and out of whose budget
those public funds come.
4. Permitting parents to enroll school-age children in any
public school within the school district in which they reside. Proposals differ as to what types of criteria school districts or their
component schools may use in limiting the choices available to parents and how students are selected where the number of otherwise
eligible applicants exceeds the available capacity of any particular
school.
5. Designating certain public schools as open to enrollment
by any eligible student in the district or, sometimes, within the
state.
Many of the elements in this loose collection of proposals are
existing practices or familiar proposals repackaged under the rubric of school choice. Several states currently offer subsidies for
private education' and many more have considered it at one time
or another. Many states have long permitted public school districts
to accept tuition-paying students from outside of the district.9
Although most school districts profess a policy of neighborhood
schools, in practice many permit transfers among schools on a
case-by-case basis if parents are sufficiently persuasive or insistent.10
General district-wide transfer plans and "freedom of choice" plans
were common in southern school districts between 1954 and
1968.11 Finally, elite or specialized schools that are open to students throughout the district, such as Bronx High School of Science, Boston Latin School, and Philadelphia's Central High and
Girls High Schools, have long been familiar in the larger urban
districts and proliferated during the 1980s as an element of school
desegregation plans.12
The school choice movement does, however, represent some8 See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1982) (Minnesota tuition tax credit);
West Morris Regional Bd. of Educ. v. Sills, 58 N.J. 464, 279 A.2d 609 (New Jersey
private school transportation subsidy), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 986 (1971).

9 See, e.g., NJ. STAT.

ANN.

§ 18A:38-3 (West 1989).

10 SUSAN PERKINS WESTON, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., CHOOSING A SCHOOL FOR YOUR
CHILD (1989), reprinted in MYRON LIEBERMAN, PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE: CURRENT IS-

suES/FuTuRE PROSPECTS 153, 156 (1990) (describing this phenomenon and recommending that parents seek transfer of their children to the public schools they prefer,
even in school districts that do not officially permit it).
11 See, e.g., Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, Va., 391 U.S. 430 (1968);
see generally, Paul Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and the Corrective
Idea, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 728, 735 (1986).
12 See, e.g., CHRISTINE H. RoSSELL, THE CARROT OR THE STICK FOR SCHOOL DESEGREGATION POLICY: MAGNET SCHOOLS OR FORCED BUSING 23-26, 41-65 (1990); Gewirtz,
supra note 11, at 761-71.
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thing genuinely new. It seeks to take various practices and proposals that have been isolated phenomena and peripheral to previous
public school reform movements, unify them under a set of common themes, and make them central to public school reform.
Broadly speaking, proponents of school choice make four
types of claims. First, school choice is a more efficient way of delivering education. Currently public education is a public monopoly,
with all the defects of a monopoly. Breaking the monopoly and
forcing schools to compete in the marketplace will not only better
match student needs and parental desires with educational resources, but will produce better education for all at lower cost. i"
Second, school choice is the remedy to the fatal organizational
defects of public education.14 Education is most effectively delivered in settings in which schools are highly autonomous and
school principals and teachers have the maximum amount of discretion and independence. This is incompatible with the current
system of democratic control and bureaucratic organization.
Third, school choice grants more liberty and autonomy to parents. 15 As currently organized, public schools do not respect or
honor either the value choices of parents or their special understanding of, and commitment to, their own children.
Fourth, school choice gives poor parents some of the options
that more affluent parents have always had. 6 Affluent families
have always been able to choose their children's schools by sending
their children to private schools or by moving to school districts, or
attendance zones within school districts, that operate the schools
parents the functional
they want. School choice gives poor
1 7
equivalent of this same opportunity.
13 MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM

85-107 (1962);

LIEBERMAN, supra

note 6.
14 CHUBB & MOE, supra note 1, at 217.
15 JOHN E. COONS & STEVEN SUGARMAN, EDUCATION BY CHOICE: THE CASE FOR FAM-

(1978).
E. Finn, Jr., Why We Need Choice, in CHOICE IN EDUCATION: POTENTIAL
AND PROBLEMS 3, 5-7 (William Lowe & HerbertJ. Walberg, 1990); Gewirtz, supra note
11, at 778-82.
17 For the most part, the proponents of school choice have not followed this claim
to its logical consequence. They have not included programs promoting housing
choice as part of the range of school choice reforms. Nonetheless, there is evidence
that successful programs promoting housing choice for poor urban residents are not
only the most authentic kind of school choice, but have other socially desirable consequences as well. See, e.g., James E. Rosenbaum et al., Can the Kerner Commission's Housing Strategy Improve Employment, Education, and Social Integrationfor Low Income Blacks?,
71 N.C. L. REV. 1519 (1993); Florence Wagman Roisman & Hilary Botein, Housing
Mobility and Life Choices, 27 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 4 (Special Issue 1993).
ILY CONTROL
16 Chester
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Opponents of the various school choice proposals contest all
these claims or assert that there are other countervailing
18
concerns.
Although the most radical school choice reforms would disestablish the existing system of public schools and replace it with a
system of education vouchers good at schools operated by both
public and private entities, virtually all the school choice proposals
that have actually been implemented have been limited to offering
parents choices among public schools, either within a single district or across district lines within a single state. 9 Debates over
"public school choice" have focused less on the desirability or undesirability of the concept-virtually all commentators can point to
some version of public school choice that they regard is at least
marginally beneficial 2 -than on the details of implementation.
Within this smaller realm, policy debates have emerged over
21
what the systemic constraints upon parental choice should be.
Clearly limitations of space will make it impossible for every parent
to enroll his or her child in his or her preferred school. Should
18 See, e.g., James S. Liebman, Voice, Not Choice, 101 YALE L.J. 279 (1991) (comprehensively reviewing policy and legal objections) (book review); Albert 0. Hirschman,
Exit and Voice: An Expanding Sphere of Influence, in RIVAL VIEWS OF MARKET SOCIETY AND
OTHER RECENT ESSAYS 77, 77-89 (1986) (economic efficiency); Michael Krashinsky,
Why Education Vouchers May Be Bad Economics, 88 TCHRS. C. REC. 139 (1986) (same);

Valerie E. Lee & Anthony S. Bryk, Science or Policy Argument? A Review of the Quantitative Evidence in Chubb and Moe's Politics Markets, and America's Schools, in SCHOOL
CHOICE: EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE 185, 185-208 (Edith Rasell & Richard Rothstein
eds., 1993) (democratic control and bureaucracy); Marla E. Sukstorf et al., A Re-examination of Chubb and Moe's Politics, Markets, and America's Schools, in SCHOOL CHOICE:
EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE 209-18 (Edith Rasell & Richard Rothstein eds., 1993)
(same); Donald R. Moore & Suzzanne Davenport, School Choice: the New Improved Sorting Machine, in CHOICE IN EDUCATION: POTENTIAL AND PROBLEMS 187, 187-224 (William Lowe Boyd & HerbertJ. Walberg eds., 1990) (liberty, autonomy, and benefit to

poor families); Amy Stuart Wells, The Sociology of School Choice: Why Some Win and Others
Lose in the EducationalMarketplace, in SCHOOL CHOICE: EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE 29, 2948 (Edith Rasell & Richard Rothstein eds., 1993) (same). Some of the most vigorous
critiques of school choice proposals come from proponents of different school choice
proposals. See, e.g., LIEBERMAN, supra note 10 (critiquing public school choice);
THERNSTROM, supra note 6 (same) ;John E. Coons, Perestroikaand the Private Provider,in
LIBERATING SCHOOLS: EDUCATION IN THE INNER CITY 181, 181-198 (David Boaz ed.,

1991) (same).

19 CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, supra note 4, at 99112. The one highly visible exception is a small program undertaken in Milwaukee.

SeeJohn F. Witte, The Milwaukee ParentalChoice Program,in SCHOOL CHOICE: EXAMINING
EVIDENCE 69, 69-110 (Edith Rasell & Richard Rothstein eds., 1993);James B. Egle,

THE

Comment, The ConstitutionalImplications of School Choice, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 459.
20 See, e.g., PositionStatements on Choice from National Organizations,in U.S. DEP'T OF
EDUC., supra note 7 (collecting position papers prepared by various organizations).
21 See, e.g., U.S. DE"T OF EDUC., GETING STARTED: How CHOICE CAN RENEW YOUR
PUJBLC SCHOOLS 19-24 (1992); THERNSTROM, supra note 6, at 9-36.
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there be any constraints other than that of space? Should eligibility standards be set for some or all schools? If so, by some central
body or by the administrators of the schools themselves? If the latter, how much discretion should school administrators have in setting their eligibility standards and selecting their own students?
How should students be selected if there are more eligible applicants than spaces at a particular school? If parents do not affirmatively choose a school, should students automatically be assigned to
their neighborhood school? If not, what happens to children
whose parents express no affirmative choice or do not enter the
system until after the date for making choices is past? Should there
be constraints upon parent choice to discourage racial segregation
or foster racial integration?
All of these questions are obviously of great practical importance; some raise much larger policy issues. The last questionWhat constraints, if any, should be imposed on parental choice to
prevent racial segregation or foster racial integration in the public
schools?-is especially emotional. The debate on this question is
driven by both historical and practical considerations. The widest
experience with public school choice has been with the various voluntary transfer and freedom of choice plans adopted by formerly
dejure segregated school districts in the wake of Brown 11.22 These
plans were intended to create a structure that was nominally nondiscriminatory and racially neutral while maintaining the reality of
racial segregation. Generally speaking, they were effective in doing
SO.

23

A dozen years after the Supreme Court rejected transfer and
"freedom of choice" plans as a remedy for dejure segregation in the
south, the Reagan administration commenced an active campaign
of replacing desegregation plans, especially in the north and west,
that involved mandatory student assignments with "voluntary
choice" plans, sometimes involving the creation of "magnet
schools" in minority neighborhoods.2 4 While there remains an active debate among advocates of school desegregation as to feasibility and effectiveness of magnet schools as a device for
Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
See Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Monroe
v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450 (1968); see generally, Gewirtz, supra note 11, at 735.
Transfer policies were used in the north, as well as the south, to maintain racial segregation in the schools. See Charles L. Glenn, The Massachusetts Experience with Public
School Choice, in NATIONAL GOVERNORs AssOCIATION, TIME FOR RESULTS: TASK FORCE
ON PARENTAL ENVOLVEMENT AND CHOICE, SUPPORTING WoRKs 31, 35-37 (1986).
24 Gewirtz, supra note 11, at 770-71.
22

23
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desegregation,2 5 the Reagan administration initiative was perceived
as an overt strategy to undo efforts to desegregate public school
systems in the north and west.26 Thus, for historical reasons, even
public school choice proposals trigger fears and suspicions that
one of the intended effects of school choice is to terminate efforts
to desegregate schools
in the north and west and resegregate
27
schools in the south.
In practice, public school choice has the potential to foster or
perpetuate racial segregation in the schools in several different
ways. Parents of white students are extremely reluctant to have
their children attend schools with substantial minority enrollment
or located in minority neighborhoods, regardless of any other
characteristics of the school. 21 More affluent and educated families make school choice decisions based upon more, and more sophisticated, data, and utilize the choice programs more
aggressively. 29 For the most part, these "active choosers" do not
make choices on the basis of the distinctive educational characteristics of the various schools, but on other considerations, such as
location.3 0 In communities where income and education are correlated with race, these children are disproportionately white. A
public school choice plan might thus permit white active choosers
25

Compare ROSSELL, supra note 12, withJENNIFER L.

HocHscHiD, THE NEW AMERI-

CAN DILEMMA: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
26 Gewirtz, supra note 11, at 770-71.

75-79 (1984).

27 The fact that the school choice movement has been actively promoted by the
Reagan and Bush administrations and supported by proponents of the civil rights
policies of these administrations has, of course, done nothing to calm those anxieties.
This anxiety may not be wholly fanciful. SeeJim Hilton, Note, Local Autonomy, Educational Equity, and Choice: A Criticism of a Proposalto Reform America's EducationalSystem,
72 B.U. L. REV. 973, 975-76 (1992) (discussing connection between opponents of
school desegregation in Boston and supporters of Massachusetts's school choice
legislation).
28 ROSSELL, supra note 12, at 115 (reviewing literature). It should be emphasized
that while this may be the result of subjective racial prejudice, it need not be. White
parents may, in the absence of better information, treat the racial makeup of a
school's enrollment as a proxy for the quality of the school and the achievement level
of the students. Id. at 16-19.
29 Moore & Davenport, supra note 18; LIEBERMAN, supra note 10, at 35-38; Liebman, supra note 18, at 285-86 & nn.145-47; Wells, supra note 18; Barbara Strobert,
Factors Influencing Parental Choice in Selection of a Magnet School in the Montclar,
NewJersey, Public Schools 97-103 (unpublished dissertation, Columbia Teachers College, UMI Order No. 9121214, 1991); Amy Stuart Wells, Public School Choice: Issues and
Concerns for Urban Educators, ERIC/CUE Digest No. 63, EDRS 322275 (1990) (reviewing literature).

30

16.

CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING,

supra note 4, at 12-
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to selectively enroll in schools that are predominantly white rather
than schools that are racially balanced or predominantly minority.
On the other hand, minority families, even minority active
choosers, may not aggressively choose schools that are predominantly white. While this may be a matter of ideological choice,3 1 it
may also be the result of other factors: the heavier reliance by
many minority parents on information provided by friends or relatives who already have children in the school, which inclines
choices toward schools that already have a substantial minority enrollment; fear that their children will be unwelcome or unable to
compete; and alienation from, and cynicism about, public schools
as an institution."
These problems are likely to be exacerbated if the children in
families that do not affirmatively exercise their opportunity to
choose are automatically assigned to their neighborhood schools,
because this makes it easy for active choosers to identify and avoid
racially balanced or minority schools. For similar reasons, it is
likely to be exacerbated if white families in urban areas with substantial minority populations have the option of choosing to enroll
in suburban schools that are almost entirely white."3 Finally, it is
also likely to be exacerbated if some schools can select their students on the basis of grades, test scores, or past disciplinary record,
all of which can serve as proxies for race, or at least have the foreseeable effect of disproportionately favoring white students over
minority students.3 4
The most comprehensive study of the impact of school choice
plans on racial segregation concludes that school choice plans that
do not include both racial controls on transfers and selective location of especially desirable "magnet schools" in minority neighborhoods are likely to increase the degree of racial segregation.3 5
31 Wells, supra note 18, at 39.
32 Wells, supra note 18, at 34-47 (case study of minority families participating in the

school choice program in St. Louis); Strobert, supra note 29, at 97-103; see generally,
Gewirtz, supra note 11, at 741-49 (exploring internal and external constraints that
might lead minority parents not to utilize choice to enroll their children in white
schools).
33 LIEBERMAN, supra note 10, at 35-38.
34 Moore & Davenport, supranote 18, at 190-203; THERN TROM, supra note 6, at 8286.
35 ROSSELL, supra note 12, at 106-08, 197-200; see also, Michael Alves & Paul L.
Pryde, Jr., Comments and General Discussion, inSCHOOL CHOICE: EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE 135, 135-37 (Edith Rasell & Richard Rothstein eds., 1993). The data on school
transfers from Minneapolis under Minnesota's statewide school choice program are
especially striking. In 1988-89, 47% of the students in Minneapolis were minority, but
only 19% of the applicants for transfer to suburban schools outside the city were mi-
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As a result of the potential that public school choice programs
will foster or perpetuate racial segregation, many proponents of
school choice have advocated what has come to be known as "controlled choice." Advocates of this approach argue that parents'
choices should be subject, among other things, to constraints
designed to foster racial integration or at least restrain tendencies
toward racial segregation.3 6 There are two distinct types of controls a school district might impose. "Racial balance" controls seek
to keep the racial makeup of each of the schools in the district
approximately equal to the racial makeup of the district as a whole.
Thus, in a district where the student enrollment is sixty percent
minority, whites might be prohibited from enrolling in schools that
are less than fifty percent minority and minority students might be
prohibited from enrolling in programs that are more than seventy
percent minority. 37 "Anti-tipping" controls seek to keep whites
from fleeing the district. If school officials feel that the tipping
point3 l is forty percent minority in a district where the enrollment
is sixty percent minority, they might prohibit minority students
from enrolling in schools that are more than forty percent minority, even though this guarantees that some other schools in the district must have minority enrollments in excess of the district-wide
nority. Most of the white applicants were located in neighborhoods near the suburban border whose schools were predominantly minority. LIEBERMAN, supra note 10, at
35-38; but see Stephen Plank et al., Effects of Choice on Education, in SCHOOL CHOICE:
EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE 111, 129 (Edith Rasell & Richard Rothstein eds., 1993)
(concluding that while magnet schools increased interracial exposure for whites and
decreased interracial exposure for African-Americans, other "schools of choice" were
neutral as to interracial exposure). Plank and his colleagues do not seem, however, to
have distinguished between "controlled choice" and "uncontrolled choice" in their
study.
36 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 21, at 19-24; Evans Clinchy, Providing
Data and Policy Recommendations in Answer to Twelve Questions Raised by the Task Force, in
NATIONAL GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION, TIME FOR RESULTS: TASK FORCE ON PARENTAL ENVOLVEMENT AND CHOICE, SUPPORTING WORKS

54, 77-79 (1986).

37 See, for example, model policy recommended in TIMOTHY W. YOUNG & EVANS
CLINCHY, CHOICE IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 147-52 (1992); see generally, THERNSTROM, supra
note 6, at 12-23 (surveying "controlled choice" programs in Massachusetts).
38 "Tipping point" commonly refers to the level of minority enrollment that sets in
motion a spiral of defections by white students. Researchers have placed the tipping
point at various points between 30% and 40%. Christine H. Rossell & Willis D.
Hawley, Understanding White Fight and Doing Something About It, in EFFECTIVE SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION 157, 165-71 (Willis D. Hawley ed., 1981). It is clear, however, that

there is no single tipping point. Whether, and at what level of minority enrollment, a
school will tip is dependent on a variety of factors, including, but certainly not limited
to, the perceived quality of the school, the availability of other alternatives to white

parents, the social class of the families of the white and minority students in the
school, and whether the school is a neighborhood school in a changing
neighborhood.
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Controlled choice, however, has its critics.4" They argue that
the element of "control" in controlled choice so overwhelms the
element of "choice" that controlled choice is not really a school
reform at all. More particularly, they argue that the controls
designed to achieve racial integration entail discrimination on the
basis of race against both white students and minority students and
that "anti-tipping" controls especially disadvantage minority students, disproportionately denying them the opportunity to obtain
admission to their preferred choices. Such controls, they argue,
are an unconstitutional form of racial discrimination.4"
Anti-tipping controls certainly disproportionately limit the opportunities of minority students to enroll in white schools. 42 That
is, after all, their intent. Whether "racial balance" controls disproportionately limit the choices of either whites or minorities is a
much more uncertain question. It appears to depend on such factors as the racial makeup of the school district, the extent to which
the various schools have space available, and the degree of residential segregation. 43 There is some evidence that controls in Boston
and Minneapolis disproportionately restrict the choices of white
students, 44 but one certainly cannot generalize from this scanty
data.
Claims that racial controls in public school choice plans are
unconstitutional are, of course, a special case of the more general
claim that any racially conscious student assignment policy is unconstitutional. To assess the strength of the claim specifically as
applied to controlled choice plans, it is useful to consider first the
more general claim.
The constitutional objection to racially conscious student assignment policies is that they treat individuals differently on the
basis of race. For example, in a school district with two elementary
39 See, e.g., Parents Ass'n of AndrewJackson High Sch. v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705 (2d
Cir. 1979) (barring minority transfer to schools with 50% or greater minority enrollment, even though minorities made up more than 73% of the enrollment in the
community as a whole); Johnson v. Board of Educ., 604 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1979).
40 THERNSTROM, supra note 6, at 27-37; David Boaz, Public School Monopoly:
America's Berlin Wall, in LIBERATING ScHooLs: EDUCATION IN THE INNER Crry 34-36
(David Boaz ed., 1991); IJEBERMAN, supra note 10, at 27-31.
41 Michael Heise, An Empiricaland ConstitutionalAnalysis of Racial Ceilings and Public

Schools, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 921 (1993).
42 Heise, supra note 41; seeJohnson, 604 F.2d at 510-13 (describing effect on trans-

fers by minority students under "anti-tipping" controls).
43 THERNSTROM, supra note 6, at 23.
44 LIEBERMAN, supra note 10, at 36-37; THERNSTROM, supra note 6, at 28 n.22.
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schools, School M predominantly minority, School W predominantly white, some minority students in School M may be reassigned to School W, but no white students in School M will be
reassigned to School W. Similarly some white students in School W
may be transferred to School M, but no minority students will be
transferred to School M. Regardless of whether the reassignment
or non-reassignment pleases or displeases the students involved, it
clearly does entail treating students differently on the basis of their
race. 45 In the conventional "two-tiered" equal protection analysis
this involves a "suspect" classification that is permissible only if supported both by a showing that this classification is justified by a
sufficiently compelling governmental
interest and "necessary" to
46
advance that governmental interest.
Claims that racially conscious school assignment policies are
unconstitutional arise in at least three different settings. Racially
conscious assignment policies that are intended to foster or perpetuate racial segregation are the essence of dejure segregation. They
are clearly unconstitutional.4 7 On the other hand, racially conscious assignment policies which are designed to remedy de jure
segregation are clearly permissible, at least until the effects of de
jure segregation are fully eliminated.48
Even where racial segregation in the schools is not the result
of past or present de jure segregation, state or local officials may
conclude that racial integration is desirable or even necessary to
achieve the educational mission of the public schools. They might
49
put the rationale in the following terms:
Segregated education denies a quality education to both
45 Not all plans to remedy school segregation necessarily entail race-conscious student assignment policies. The school district might, for example, convert School M
to a K-3 school and School W to a 4-6 school, each serving the entire school district.
All assignments in this type of plan are made without regard to race. See Fuller v.
Volk, 230 F. Supp. 25 (DN.J. 1964), vacated, 351 F.2d 323 (3d Cir. 1965); Vetere v.
Allen, 245 N.Y.S.2d 480 (App. Div.), aff'd, 206 N.E.2d 174, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 825
(1965). In general, however, the larger the school district and more thoroughly segregated its residential patterns, the less likely it is that a student assignment plan can
be devised that is not race conscious.
46 See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305 (1978); Wygant v.Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986).
47 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
48 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ. 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971).
49 See, e.g., HOCHSCHILD, supra note 25, at 172; Owen M. Fiss, 78 HARv. L. REv. 564,
567-70 (1965). Obviously not all educators would subscribe to all of these arguments,
and some would not subscribe any of them. Among African-Americans there is clearly
a contrary stream of thought that says that school desegregation is no longer a worthy
goal and that reformers should focus their efforts on improving schools attended by
African-American children.
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white students and minority students. It makes it impossible to
teach interracial cooperation and tolerance, indispensable skills
for whites as well as racial minorities in a society that is increasingly heterogeneous and multi-racial. These skills are not
merely learned in the classroom. They are also learned in the
lunch line, the schoolyard, and the halls. They are taught by
example as well as by precept. Genuine racial integration of the
public schools is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition
for learning and teaching interracial tolerance and cooperation.
If white students attend schools where there are no minorities
or minorities attend schools where there are no whites, this indispensable condition cannot be met.
Segregated education is unequal education. It isolates minorities from the mainstream of society and denies them both
the opportunity to test themselves against members of the white
majority and the confidence borne of experience that they can
successfully compete in school or life with members of the white
majority. On the other hand, minority students who attend racially integrated schools have better long-term life prospects
than those who attend racially segregated schools.
Defacto segregation creates a class of "minority schools" in
whose quality the white majority in society has no economic or
personal stake. Taxpayers, voters, parents, and school children
pejoratively perceive the small number of schools in which the
black and Hispanic students are concentrated as "minority
schools." With a handful of notable exceptions, such "minority
schools" receive less resources and are less successful by every
measure. The vast majority of voters, taxpayers, and parents,
however, have no economic or personal stake in this failure. It
takes place somewhere else, to someone else's children, and is
someone else's responsibility to fix. So long as the white majority
has no economic or personal stake in the quality of education
that minority children receive, these children will not receive
educational opportunities equal to those received by white
children.
The constitutional objections to race-conscious student assignment policies to remedy de facto segregation have been litigated in a
variety of cases, almost exclusively in the state courts. Courts have invariably upheld the constitutionality of such plans, whether adopted
voluntarily by local school districts, imposed by state education departments, or imposed by the courts under state constitutional provisions
that prohibit de facto segregation.5 °
50 See, e.g., Offermann v. Nitkowski, 378 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1967); Crawford v. Board
of Educ., 551 P.2d 28 (Cal. 1976); Tometz v. Board of Educ., 237 N.E.2d 498 (Ill.
1968); School Comm. v. Board of Educ., 227 N.E.2d 729 (Mass. 1967), appeal dis-
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The United States Supreme Court dismissed appeals from two of
these state court decisions "for lack of substantial federal question.""1
The Court has never addressed the subject in a plenary opinion. The
Court has, however, commented upon the issue in dictum in several
cases. In Swann v. Charlotte-MecklenburgBoard of Education,5 2 the Court
contrasted the narrow remedial powers of the federal courts with the
broader policy-making powers of local school officials:
School authorities are traditionally charged with broad
power to formulate and implement educational policy and
might well conclude, for example, that in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society each school should have a
prescribed ratio of Negro to white students reflecting the proportion for the district as a whole. To do this as an educational
policy is within the broad discretionary power of school authorities; absent a finding of constitutional violation, however, that
would not be within the authority of a federal court.5 3
In the companion case of North Carolina Board of Education v.
Swann,5 4 the Court contrasted the power of school officials to require
busing to achieve racial balance with their lack of power to prohibit
busing where doing so perpetuates dejure segregation, and reiterated
the thought expressed in Swann in slightly different language:
We observed in Swann ... that school authorities have wide

discretion in formulating school policy, and that as a matter of
educational policy school authorities may well conclude that
some kind of racial balance in the schools is desirable quite
apart from any constitutional requirements.5 5
The Court next commented on this issue in Board of Regents v.
Bakke.56 Bakke concerned a medical school's policy of reserving a
missed, 389 U.S. 572 (1968); Board of Educ. of Englewood Cliffs v. Board of Educ. of
Englewood, 257 N.J. Super. 413, 608 A.2d 914 (App. Div. 1992), affd mem., 132 N.J.
327, 625 A.2d 483, cert. denied, 62 U.S.L.W. 3375 (1993); Booker v. Board of Educ., 45
N.J. 161, 212 A.2d 1 (1965); Morean v. Board of Educ., 42 N.J. 237, 200 A.2d 97
(1964); Addabbo v. Donovan, 209 N.E.2d 112 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 905 (1965);
Pennsylvania State Human Rights Comm'n v. Chester Sch. Dist., 233 A.2d 290 (Penn.
1967); Citizens for Better Educ. v. Goose Creek Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 719 S.W.2d
350 (Texas Ct. App. 1986), appeal dismissed, 484 U.S. 804 (1987); Citizens Against
Mandatory Bussing v. Palmason, 495 P.2d 657 (Wash. 1972).
51 Citizensfor Better Educ., 484 U.S. 804 (1987); School Comm., 389 U.S. 572 (1968).
52 402 U.S. 1.
53
54
55

Id. at 16.

402 U.S. 43 (1971).
Id. at 45. In another case decided the same day, McDaniel v. Barresi, the Court
upheld a voluntary plan to assign children on the basis of race to achieve racial balance, but the Court clearly understand the plan to have been formulated to remedy de
jure segregation. 402 U.S. 39, 41 (1971).
56

438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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number of slots in its entering class each year for racial minorities. By
a 5-4 margin, the Court struck down this policy on the grounds that
any governmental action that distributes a benefit or imposes a burden upon an individual on the basis of race is impermissible, absent a
sufficiently strong governmental justification.5 7 By a different 5-4 margin, however, the Court declared in dictum that universities could utilize race conscious admission criteria to select students where
maintaining "diversity" of their student body was integral to their educational mission. The Court declared that this was a "compelling"
58
governmental justification for a race conscious admission policy.

The Court observed in a footnote that the university admission policy
was fundamentally different from a racially conscious public school
pupil assignment plan because it denies the applicant a place in the
program altogether, while the pupil assignment plan merely changes
the location at which the pupil receives a comparable public school
education.5 9
A Los Angeles organization, Bustop, Inc., sought on several occasions to put before the Court the claim that a racially conscious pupil
assignment plan imposed by the California state courts on the Los
Angeles school district to eliminate de facto segregation that was racially discriminatory in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The
organization sought a stay of the state court remedial order in 1978.
Then-Justice Rehnquist denied the stay with the explanation that
this is not the traditional argument of a local school board contending that it has been required by court order to implement a
pupil assignment plan which was not justified by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United State Constitution. The argument is
indeed novel, and suggests that each citizen of a State who is
either a parent or a schoolchild has a "federal right" to be "free
from racial quotas and to be free from extensive pupil transportation that destroys fundamental rights to liberty and privacy."
While I have the gravest doubts that the Supreme Court of California was requiredby the United States Constitution to take the
action that it has taken in this case, I have very little doubt that
it was permitted by that Constitution to take such action.6
Justice Powell denied a second stay application relying on the reasons
given by Justice Rehnquist.6
57 Id. at

320.

Id. at 311-15.
59 Id. at 300 n.39.
60 Bustop, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 439 U.S. 1380, 1382-83 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1978).
61 Bustop, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 439 U.S. 1384 (Powell, Circuit Justice 1978).
58
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The case came back to the Court four years later under the caption Crawford v. Board of Education6 2 as a challenge to a subsequent
California constitutional amendment barring the state courts from ordering busing or mandatory pupil assignments to achieve racial balance. The Court found it unnecessary to reach Bustop's
constitutional claim, upholding the constitutional amendment on
other grounds.63
In the companion case to Crawford,however, Washington v. Seattle
School DistrictNo. 1, 4 the Supreme Court struck down a state voter initiative that removed from school districts the power to voluntarily implement school desegregation to remedy racial imbalance. The
proponents of the voter initiative did not argue that the type of school
desegregation plans barred by the initiative violated the federal Constitution, and the Court did not address this issue.6 5 Despite this disclaimer, the majority opinion described the desegregation plans that
would be barred by the initiative in considerable detail6 6 and set forth
the educational rationales for such plans sympathetically.6 7 The
Court expressed the view that such plans may be controversial but declared that
in the absence of a constitutional violation, the desirability and
efficacy of school desegregation are matters to be resolved
through the political process. 68
458 U.S. 527 (1982).
Id. at 535 n.11.
458 U.S. 457 (1982).
Id. at 472 n.15.
Id. at 459-61.
Id. at 472-74.
Id. at 474. See also Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1445 (1992) (seemingly
expressing a similar sentiment).
The dissent in Seattle School District, written by Justice Powell and joined by three
other Justices, commented on this issue in three separate footnotes. See 458 U.S. at
491 n.6, 497 n.12 & 501 n.17 (Powell, J., dissenting). The first of these footnotes
included the following remark:
Indeed, in the absence of a finding of segregation by the School District, mandatory busing on the basis of race raises constitutional difficulties of its own. Extensive pupil transportation may threaten liberty or
privacy interests.... Moreover, when a State or school board assigns
students on the basis of their race, it acts on the basis of a racial classification, and we have consistently held that "[a] racial classification, regardless of purported motivation, is presumptively invalid and can be
upheld only upon an extraordinary justification."
Id. at 491 n.6 (Powell,J., dissenting ) (quoting Personnel Admin'r of Massachusetts v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979)) (other citations omitted).
In a subsequent footnote the dissent declared:
It is far from clear that in the absence of a constitutional violation,
mandatory busing necessarily benefits racial minorities or that it is even
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
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Given the seeming force of the constitutional objection to racially conscious student assignment plans to remedy de facto segregation, why
have the courts not found it more persuasive, particularly in light of
the fact that the same types of objections have prevailed in cases71in7°
volving employment, 69 public contracts, and higher education?
A number of interrelated themes emerge from the various opinions. First, the educational justifications for racial integration are
strong and lie close to the central mission of the public schools. The
goals of teaching tolerance and cooperation among the races, of
molding a polity that is free of racial prejudice, of preventing minority
students from becoming isolated from the rest of the educational system, and eliminating, or preventing the emergence of, a problematic
class of "minority schools," all seem integral to the educational mis72
sion of the public schools.
In this respect, public schools are different from public housing,
public employment, or public contracts. Racial integration is integral
to the mission of the public schools; it has no necessary connection
with the mission of public employment, public housing, or public
73
contracts.
viewed with favor by racial minorities.... As the Court indicates, the
busing question is complex and is best resolved by the political process.
Id. at 497 n.12 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Finally, in a third footnote, Justice Powell stated that
[i]n my view, the local school board-responsible to the people of the
district it serves-is the best qualified agency of a state government to
make decisions affecting education within its district. As a policy matter, I would not favor reversal of the Seattle Board's decision to experiment with a reasonable mandatory busing program, despite my own
doubts as to the educational or social merit of such a program.
Id. at 501 n. 17 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). It hard to know quite what
to make of these footnotes-which at once suggest possible constitutional objections
and also urge that the decision to institute such policies be left exclusively to ordinary
political processes-except that the dissent, like the majority, was not seriously attempting to actually resolve these issues.
69 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
70 Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
71 Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
72 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971); Citizens
for Better Educ. v. Goose Creek Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 719 S.W.2d 350, 352-53
(Texas Ct. App. 1986), appeal dismissed, 484 U.S. 804 (1987); Booker v. Board of
Educ., 45 N.J. 161, 170-71, 212 A.2d 1, 6-7 (1965); Board of Educ. of Englewood Cliffs
v. Board of Educ. of Englewood, 257 N.J. Super. 413, 464-65, 470, 608 A.2d 914, 943,
945 (App. Div. 1992), affld mem., 132 N.J. 327, 625 A.2d 483, cert. denied, 62 U.S.L.W.
3375 (1993); Citizens Against Mandatory Bussing v. Palmason, 495 P.2d 657, 663
(Wash. 1972).
73 See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 275-76 (rejecting claim that racial integration of the
faculty of a public school lacks sufficient connection with the educational mission of
the school tojustify giving preference in layoffs to minority teachers to maintain racial
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The educational justifications for integration cannot be achieved
by merely including a token number of minorities in schools that are
otherwise white, or whites in schools that are otherwise minority. It
must involve placing every student in a racially integrated school, or as
close an approximation of that outcome as is feasible. In this respect,
public schools are different from post-secondary education. A university may have a legitimate interest in assuring that the students that it
selects for its student body experience the educational benefits of "diversity." This interest can, however, be fully protected by sprinkling,
for example, a relatively small number of minority students in a
predominantly white student population. The university has no legitimate interest, however, in what happens to the students who are not
admitted or who never apply. A school district cannot be so parochial. It has an interest in all the students in the system and must
assure them all the educational benefits of an integrated education. 4
Second, the goal of racial integration is not to benefit minority
students at the expense of white students. Racially conscious student
assignment policies do not in principle deny anyone the benefits of a
public education. To the contrary, the intended effect of these policies is to provide a better education for all students, white and minority alike. This goal may be imperfectly realized in reality, sometimes
acutely so. In principle, at least, it means that no one suffers any educational harm from racially conscious student assignment policies. In
this respect, too, public education is different from post-secondary education, employment, public housing, or public contracts, where racially conscious policies grant a benefit or impose a burden on one
person on the basis of his or her race at the expense of another.7"
Third, student assignment policies, including racially conscious
student assignment policies, involve complex educational policy
choices. These choices may involve technical issues of educational
policy which require the expertise of professional educators. Alternatively, they may involve important value choices best resolved through
political processes. Except in the clearest cases, courts feel technically
ill-equipped and institutionally out-of-place when called upon to second guess the choices made by locally accountable school officials. As
a result, the courts are strongly predisposed to defer to the judgment
balance); see also United States v. Board of Educ., 832 F. Supp. 836 (D.N.J. 1993)
(expanding the rationale of Wygant).
74 Booker, 45 N.J. at 180-81, 212 A.2d at 11-12 (calling for "greatest dispersal" of
minority students in the schools "consistent with sound educational values and
procedures").
75 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 300 n.39; Goose Creek, 719 S.W.2d at 352; Englewood, 257 N.J.
Super. at 468-69, 608 A.2d at 944-45.
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of local school officials in all but the clearest cases of wrongdoing. 6
Fourth, even in school systems that are not de jure segregated,
race-conscious student assignment policies operate remedially. De
facto segregation is the result of racial segregation in housing. Racial
segregation in housing is, for the most part, not the consequence of
choice on the part of minorities or of chance. Public and private discrimination are certainly contributing factors. Racially conscious student assignment policies simulate, however imperfectly, what the
school system would look like if there were no racial discrimination in
77
the housing market.
Fifth, racially conscious student assignment policies operate in
the context of a public school system in which virtually all school assignments are involuntary. Students must attend school. They are ordinarily assigned to schools involuntarily, usually based upon the
happenstance of their home addresses. They may be reassigned to
other schools on any of a variety of grounds: overcrowding; school
closures; the construction of a new school; unsafe conditions; need to
balance class sizes in various schools; and changes in bus routes. Parents have no legally protected right to have their children attend any
particular school, or to have any individual say in what school their
children attend. Thus, racially conscious student assignment does not
deprive families of anything to which they are otherwise entitled.7 8
Finally, public education is mass education. It does not purport
to provide each student with the education that is most perfectly tailored to his or her desires, or even to his or her educational needs. At
best, school systems provide the mass education that is most beneficial
to most of the students. Some families will inevitably and justifiably be
dissatisfied. That, however, is merely the unavoidable consequence of
providing mass education. Except in extreme circumstances, families
are not entitled to a program tailored to the individual needs or
desires of their child nor, in general, are they entitled to exercise any
individual control over the educational programs that their children
receive. Thus, the fact that race-conscious student assignment policies
leave some students or their families dissatisfied does not deprive
79
those students of any rights they would otherwise have.
In light of these themes, does it make a difference that the ra76 Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1, 458 U.S. 457, 474 (1982); Vetere v. Allen,
206 N.E.2d 174, 174-76 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 825 (1965).
77 Crawford v. Board of Educ., 551 P.2d 28, 34, 40-41 (1976).
78 Bustop, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 439 U.S. 1380, 1382-83 (Rehnquist, CircuitJustice 1978); Citizens Against Mandatory Bussing v. Palmason, 495 P.2d 657, 662-63
(Wash. 1972).
79 Palmason, 495 P.2d at 665.
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cially conscious student assignment policies occur in the setting of a
public school choice program? For "racial balance" controls, it arguably makes a difference in three ways. First, in the context of a public
school choice plan, student assignments are, at least presumptively, no
longer involuntary. Families are free to select the school they prefer.
"Racial balance" controls that restrict the choices of some families on
the basis of their race arguably deprive them of the opportunity to
choose schools available to all other families.
This argument, however, is easy to overstate. No public school
choice plan guarantees every family its first choice. Families will be
driven back to the their second, third, or fourth choice because of
lack of space in the most popular programs, or because their child
cannot satisfy the eligibility requirements. How severe these limitations on choice will be depends on circumstances in the school district
largely out of the family's control.
Second, the effect of "racial balance" controls is that one child
gets into his or her program of choice at the expense of another child,
and does so on the basis of race. Arguably this now resembles the
situation in Bakke, Wygant, and Croson. This comparison, however, is
unsound. As characterized by Justice Powell in Bakke,8 ° even racially
conscious non-choice student assignment plans routinely deny some
students the opportunity to attend the school they really wish to attend, their own neighborhood school, and give that spot to some
other student on the basis of race. Unlike post-secondary admissions,
however, controlled choice policies do assure the child a place in another school, presumably equally good and offering the additional educational benefits of racial integration.
Third, in an ideal world the provision of school choice would obviate the need for special efforts to maintain racial balance. The
school a child attends would no longer depend upon the happenstance of his or her home address. Even in communities that are
strongly racially segregated, all families could, if they so choose, send
their children to racially integrated schools. There are no "minority"
schools, although there may be schools that market themselves to minority families by offering programs that appeal especially to the preferences of those families. There are no racially linked differences in
the quality of schools, because parents who are dissatisfied with their
child's current school can select another next year. Schools in minority neighborhoods that wish to be racially balanced can do so by offering programs that appeal especially to families of white students.
80

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 300 n.39.
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In this ideal world, the justification for "racial balance controls"
does not entirely disappear-educators may still wish to maintain racial integration to make possible the teaching of interracial tolerance
and cooperation, just as they may insist that all students learn spelling
or attend physical education classes-but it is surely much less compelling. Racial balance controls would no longer operate to neutralize the legacy of segregation and discrimination, but would rather
operate to restrict choices freely made by minorities and whites alike.
Although this vision clearly inspires some school choice proponents, a it is merely a vision. The reality is that the choices of white
and minority families are still influenced by considerations of race,
and that in the absence of controls, school choice leads to racial segregation in all but the most exceptional school districts. 3
In sum, for "racial balance" controls, it makes little difference to
the constitutional analysis that the racially conscious student assignment policies occur in the setting of a public school choice program.
The educational justification for integrated education remains unchanged. Indeed, all the themes outlined above still make themselves
heard, except perhaps that of the involuntariness of public education.
Anti-tipping controls present a more serious constitutional question. The same considerations that lead courts to uphold the constitutionality of racially conscious student assignments in general are
applicable to racially conscious constraints on school choice. Restricting transfers on the basis of race, not to achieve racial balance, but to
preserve racial imbalance, is dejure segregation." It can only be sustained if necessary to advance a compelling governmental interest.
Preventing tipping, and thus preserving a degree of racial integration
in schools that would otherwise be wholly single-race schools, does advance the government's interest in integrated education. This interest
is at least as compelling as the interest of post-secondary educational
institutions in "diversity." The level of the cap on minority enrollment, however, must be shown to be no lower than necessary to serve
this interest.
The courts in the two cases that have addressed this issue, Johnson
v. Board of Educationa5 and Parent Association of Andrew Jackson High
81 THERNSTROM,

supra note 6, at 27-36; Boaz, supra note 40, at 34-36;

LIEBERMAN,

supra note 10, at 27-31.
82

Gewirtz, supra note 11, at 760.
supra note 12, at 106-08, 197-200; see alsoAlves, supra note 35, at 135-37.
United States v. Charleston County Sch. Dist., 960 F.2d 1227, 1234-36 (4th Cir.

83 ROSSELL,
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1992).
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604 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1979).
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School v. Ambach,"6 have followed just this analysis. In both cases, the
court held that the anti-tipping controls could be sustained only upon
a showing a compelling governmental interest and found that
preventing tipping and preserving some degree of integration was
such an interest. Both courts, however, struggled with the issue of
whether the cap on minority enrollment was really at the highest level
that would still prevent tipping. In Johnson, the court accepted the
district claim that this was so. In Ambach, the court was left unsatisfied
and remanded the case twice for additional proofs on this issue.
That controlled choice is constitutional does not, of course, assure that it is wise educational policy. That depends upon whether
the school choice movement can actually achieve an acceptable approximation of the ideal world of choice that its proponents envision.
If it can, controlled choice will in all likelihood cease naturally to have
any impact on the choices available to families. It will quietly wither
away. If it cannot, proponents of public school choice in urban areas
will themselves be obliged to choose between openly abandoning the
goal of racially integrated education or embracing some version of
controlled choice.
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598 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1979), after remand, 738 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1984).

